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Reed: Constitutional Law - Residency Restrictions upon Teachers' Right

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Residency Restrictions Upon Teachers' Right of
Travel. O'Melia v. Sweetwater County School District No. 1, 497 P.2d
540 (Wyo. 1972).

The contracts of two teachers, Joseph O'Melia and Joseph Roush, were terminated for violation of a school board
policy that asserted, "New teachers being hired by the district will be expected to reside in the community [of Warnsutter] at least five days a week . . . ." The school board
maintained teacherages at minimal rental in the town of
Wamsutter. Initially, the plaintiffs occupied the teacherages
full time, but after their marriages they moved to Rawlins,
40 miles away. The District Court ruled against both teachers.
The Wyoming Supreme Court found for the continuing contract teacher, Roush, and against the initial contract teacher,
0'Melia. The Court held that the residency requirement did
not violate their constitutional right of travel since they
"voluntarily contracted to abide by a rule with a resultant
waiver.
RIGHT OF TRAVEL

The constitutional right of every citizen to live where he
chooses and to travel without restriction is fundamental to
our concept of liberty. The right of travel was explicitly
2
granted in the Articles of Confederation. Although. the right
of travel is not mentioned in the Constitution, the courts have
consistently recognized it as a basic freedom. Apparently
the founding fathers thought the right so elementary that
acknowledgment was unnecessary.'
The history of the right of travel can be characterized
by the search for a specific constitutional provision supporting it.' At various times the courts have relied upon the privi1. O'Melia v. Sweetwater County School District No. 1, 497 P.2d 540, 542
(Wyo. 1972).
2. "The people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to and from

any other state

. . ." THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION

art. IV.

3. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966); quoted in Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969).
4. For an excellent analysis of the history of the right of travel see Comment,
The Right to Travel-Its Protection and Application Under the Constitution,
400 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 66 (1971).
Copyright@ 1973 by the University of Wyoming
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leges and immunities clauses of article IV, section 2' and the
fourteenth amendment,' the due process clause of the fifth
amendment' and the commerce clause.8 The courts felt comfortable dealing with these standard constitutional provisions.
As a result, the right of travel has often been treated incidentally.
In the 1969 welfare residency case of Shapiro v. Thompson' the Supreme Court eliminated this recurring problem of
finding a supporting provision. The Court simply sidestepped
the issue by commenting, "We have no occasion to ascribe the
source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision. 1 Within a relatively short period of
time, the right to travel was utilized to overturn residency re- 1
quirements for voter registration, low rent public housing,"
state bar examinations" and hospitalization and medical
14
care.
There is a basic factual distinction between Shapiro and
O'Melia. Shapiro deals exclusively with interstate travel,
while O'Melia concerns the right to travel intrastate. A number of courts have construed this right and all have held the
right to travel intrastate "fundamental within the meaning
of Shapiro."'" In the Krzewinski decision the court reasoned:
5. "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." See, e.g., Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870); 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868).
6. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of the citizens of the United States. . . ." See. e.g., Edwards
v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 178, 181 (1941) (Douglas and Jackson, JJ., concurring) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 96 (1908).
7. E.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965); Aptheker v. Rusk, 378 U.S. 500,
505-6 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
8. Edwards v. California, supra note 6, at 173.
9. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
10. Id. at 630.
92 S. Ct. 995 (1972). Tennessee's
U.S ....
11. Dunn v. Blumenstein,
one year residency prerequisite for voter registration was held to be unconstitutional.
12. Cole v. Housing Auth. of the City of Newport, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970).
13. Keenan v. North Carolina Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350
(E.D.N.C. 1970). Contra, Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M.
1972). A three-judge U.S District Court, by a two-to-one vote, upheld the
constitutionality of a six-month residence requirement. The Court found
that the state had a compelling interest in the quality and integrity of persons whom it permitted to practice law.
14. Crapp v. Duval Hospital Auth., 314 F. Supp. 181 (M.D. Fla. 1970); Vaughn
v. Bower, 313 F. Supp. 37 (D. Ariz. 1970), al 'd, 400 U.S. 884 (1970).
15. Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 498 (D.N.J. 1972); King v. New
Rochelle Municipal Housing Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir. 1971); Cole v.
Housing Auth. of the City of Newport, 435 F.2d 807, 811 (1st Cir. 1970).
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It would be meaningless to describe the right to
travel between states as a fundamental precept of
personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a state. [Citation omitted] The soundness of this conclusion
is even more apparent when it is considered together with the refusal of the Supreme Court in
Shapiro to link the right to travel with any specific
clause of the Constitution, commerce or otherwise.' 6
It would be an anomaly if the Constitution protected a teacher's right to live in Utah, but not his right to live in another
town in Wyoming.
CONTRACTUAL WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

In O'Melia the Court dismissed the teachers' contention
that their right to live in places of their choosing was being
violated. The Wyoming Court held that O'Melia and Roush
had waived their right by voluntarily contracting to abide by
the school residency policy. 1 The fact that the teachers
signed a contract should not automatically eliminate their
constitutional rights. To give such magic to a contract clause
would tear down all constitutional restraints upon public
employers and completely discard protection of fundamental
rights.' If the board's contractual power was absolute, it
could compel teachers to vote for a particular political candidate, attend a specific church or obey any unconscionable
condition.
In examining the O'Melia case, the Wyoming Court
dwelled upon the contractual relationship between the teachers and the board. But the court's focus should have been
centered upon the key question of whether or not the school
board has the constitutional power to restrict its employees'
right of travel. Faced with a similar public employment situation the Federal District Court of New Jersey in Krzewinski
16. Krzewinski v. Kugler, supra note 15, at 498.
17. O'Melia, supra note 1, at 542.
18. For insight into the innovative method of deciding constitutional cases on
the basis of a determination as to the "requisite conditions for a functioning
political system" see BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
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v. Kugler stated that the essential question is not whether a
man can be a policeman or fireman and simultaneously assert his right to live where he chooses, "but rather whether
the interests of a municipality in asking a policeman or fireman to surrender his constitutional right to travel . . . are
sufficiently compelling to justify the creation of a working
class of immobiles."
There is ample proof that the courts do not automatically
honor all contract provisions. As early as 1926 the U. S. Supreme Court in Frost and Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad
Comm."° recognized that a state agency can not grant a benefit contingent upon the acceptance of an unconstitutional
condition.
The Court held:
Having regard to form alone, the act here is an
offer to the private carrier of a privilege, which the
state may grant or deny, upon a condition, which the
carrier is free to accept or reject. In reality, the carrier is given no choice, except a choice between the
rock and the whirlpool-an option to forego a privilege which may be vital to his livelihood or submit to
a requirement which may constitute an intolerable
burden....
It is not necessary to challenge the proposition
that, as a general rule, the state, having power to
deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such
condition as it sees fit to impose. But the power of
the state in that respect is not unlimited, and one of
the limitations is that it may not impose conditions
which require the relinquishment of constitutional
rights."'
The Frost decision has been modified by the requirement
that the Courts examine the justification for the restrictive
19. Supra note 15, at 499.
20. 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
21. Id. at 593-94. See Midwest Video Corp. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1322,
1327 (8th Cir. 1971); Lemieux v. Robbins, 294 F. Supp. 1171, 1174 (S.D.
Me. 1968) ; Bynum v. Schiro, 219 F. Supp. 204, 210 (E.D. La. 1963) ; Bruns
v. Pomerleau, 319 F. Supp. 58, 66 (D. Md. 1970); United Gas Pipeline Co.
v. Terrebonne Parish Police Jury, 319 F. Supp. 1138, 1143 (E.D. La. 1970);
Inland Steel Co. v. N.L.R.B., 170 F.2d 247, 260 (7th Cir. 1948); City of
Colorado Springs v. Kitty Hawk Developing Co., 392 P.2d 467, 482-83 (Colo.
1964) ;Downs v. Conway School Dist., 328 F. Supp. 338, 345 (E.D. Ark.
1971) ; Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1966).
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condition." The Supreme Court of California dealt with the
issue of a public employment contract waiving constitutional
rights in Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District."
The Court found that without a compelling state interest,
fundamental constitutional rights "are not subject to destruction by a public employer's insistence that they be waived by
contract [Emphasis added]." 2 4 Hence, the school board in
O'Melia should not be allowed to do by contract that which
the state is constitutionally prohibited from doing by statute.
Naturally, any public employment contract will restrict an
employee's rights to some extent. The function of the court
is to determine the validity of the particular contractual
restraint upon the individual's rights and to establish parameters within which the school board may operate.2 5
THE COMPELLING STATE INTEREST DOCTRINE

v. RATIONAL DOCTRINE

The Wyoming Supreme Court cited the District Court's
conclusion of law that "the [residency] policy was a valid and
[Emphareasonable contractual condition of employment."
sis added] This reference seems to imply that the "rational"
doctrine was used to evaluate the constitutional validity of
the board's policy. As set out in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 7 this doctrine states that the policy must be rational,
bear a reasonable relationship to a proper governmental purpose and treat all persons controlled by the policy equally.
22.

23.

24.

25.
26.
27.

For a more thorough analysis of the dodtrine of unconstitutional conditions
see Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L.
REY. 144 (1968); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1595
(1960); and French, UnconstitutionalConditions: An Analysis, 50 GEO. L.J.
234. (1961).
65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966). A nurse's aide was
discharged by defendant township hospital district for violation of statutory and contractual restrictions upon her political activities relating to
the recall of certain hospital directors. The court found no "compelling"
justification for the contract clause and declared it unconstitutional.
Id. at 415; see Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 456 P.2d 645,
653 (1969); City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1, 466 P.2d
225, 229-230 (1970) ; People v. Mason, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 488 P.2d 630, 634
(1971).
This article is directed exclusively towards public employers and does not
concern itself with contracts between private parties.
O'Melia, supra note 1, at 542.
220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26
(1961); Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947);
Metro Casualty Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935).
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The party alleging unconstitutionality must meet the heavy
burden of proving the statute or policy either "unreasonable," "irrelevant," "irrational," "arbitrary," or "invidious.""8
The "rational" doctrine would have been applicable in
O'Melia if the U.S. Supreme Court had not labelled the right
The Supreme Court only uses
to travel as "fundamental."
the adjective "fundamental" in reference to rights requiring
the highest possible degree of protection under the Constitution. Other rights, not enumerated in the Constitution,
inwhich the court has recognized as being "fundamental"
rights, 1 marriage," procriminal procedural
clude voting,"
creation, 8 and education. 4
Normally, courts recognize a presumption which operates
in favor of the reasonableness of governmental action. 5 This
favorable presumption is not applied to restrictions upon fundamental rights. 6 Thus, the O'Melia Court should have
placed a "very heavy burden of justification"" upon the
board's residency policy. The term "fundamental" necessitates the use of the "compelling state interest" doctrine. In
Shapiro the U.S. Supreme Court asserted:
Since the classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of
whether it promotes a compelling state interest. 8
[Court's emphasis]
Under this doctrine the school board would have been
required to demonstrate that the interest used to justify the
residency restraint was compelling, not merely "rational"
or "legitimate." The search, for a compelling interest to support the board's policy is limited to present interests fune28. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 673-74 (1966)
J., dissenting).
29. Shapiro, aupra note 3, at 630.
30. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, supra note 28.
31. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
32. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
33. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
34. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., supra note 27.
36. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 633 (1969).
37. Loving v. Virginia, supra note 32, at 9.
38. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 638.
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tioning as an actual basis for the restriction." This means
that the school board must produce an existing justification
and demonstrate that it actually furthers its compelling interest. The board must also show that its restrictions are no
greater than necessary and are the constitutionally optimum
solution to the stated purpose of the policy. In Dunn v.
Blumenstein the U. S. Supreme Court prohibited the state of
Tennessee from choosing "means which unnecessarily burden
or restrict constitutionally protected activity.""0 The means
must be tailored to serve their legitimate objectives. Thus,
the restrictions on the teacher's right of travel can be no
greater than absolutely necessary to further the school board's
legitimate interests. There must be no other acceptable
method to achieve the desired objective.
Some courts have distinguished situations of mere "incidental" infringements on the right to travel. The courts
which follow this line of reasoning4 ' speak in terms of deterrent intent or actual deterrence upon the fundamental right
of travel. They interpret Shapiro's fundamental right as
being the right to food, clothing and shelter" rather than the
right to travel. The California Court in Kirk v. Board of
Regents distinguished Shapiro by maintaining that residency
requirements for tuition-free education are not important
enough to inhibit interstate travel and are not as "fundamental" to survival and subsistence as welfare benefits. 3
Based upon this finding the Kirk Court held that it is not
proper to consider the issues under the stringent compelling
state interest doctrine. Instead, the "rational" doctrine of
reasonableness is the standard employed to examine the
residency requirement for tuition."
The Kirk line of reasoning was specifically rejected in
Carter v. Gallagher." The Carter court held that the U.S.
Supreme Court utilized the compelling state interest doe39. Krzewinski v. Kugler, supra note 15, at 501.
40. Dunn v. Blumenstein, supra note 11, at 1003.
41. Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), af 'd,401 U.S. 985
(1971); Kirk v. Bd. of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260
(1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970).
42. Starns v. Malkerson, supra note 41, at 238.
43. Kirk v. Bd. of Regents, supra note 41, at 266.
44. Id. at 267.
45. 337 F. Supp. 626 (D. Minn. 1971).
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trine in Shapiro because the welfare residency restrictions
"impinged upon the fundamental right of interstate movement" rather than the right to the fundamental necessities
of life.4" Citing numerous cases, the Carter court found no
need to establish a deterrent effect or intent upon the exercise of the right of interstate movement.4" They maintained
that "it is sufficient that the statute [or policy] merely operate as a penalty upon the exercise of the right [of travel] ""
to necessitate the use of the compelling state interest doctrine.
The school board's residency policy in O'Melia would
require the application of the compelling state interest doctrine under either the Kirk or the Carter decisions. Obviously, the residency restrictions penalize the teacher's exercise of their right to live in a place of their own choosing.
Thus, the Carter standards for employing the compelling
state interest doctrine have been fulfilled. The Kirk court
labelled the right to establish a domicile wherever one chooses
as "fundamental" within the meaning of Shapiro's necessities of life (i.e., shelter)." Being fired for violation of the
board's policy also has a definite deterrent effect upon the
exercise of the right to travel. Hence, the O'Melia situation
would not be included under the Kirk type of exception to
Shapiro.
In the past, the "public coffer" theory and the "rightprivilege" dichotomy have been employed as compelling bases
for residency requirements. The public coffer theory maintains that money paid to employees should remain within the
municipality (or school district) which pays their salaries."
The right-privilege rationale holds that public employment
46. Id. at 632; citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) ; Cole v. Housing Auth. of the City of Newport, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970); King v.
New Rochelle Municipal Housing Auth., 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971); cf.
Keppel v. Donovan, 326 F. Supp. 15, 19-20 (D. Minn. 1970).
47. Id. at 631-32; Cole v. Housing Auth. of the City of Newport, supra note 46;
Vaughn v. Bower, 313 F. Supp. 37 (D. Ariz. 1970), aff'd, 400 U.S. 884
(1970); King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Auth., supra note 46;
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582-83 (1968) ; Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 403-4 (1962); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970).
48. Id. at 632.
49. Kirk v. Bd. of Regents, supra note 41, at 266-67.
50. People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427, a/i'd sub nom., Crane v. New
York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
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is a privilege rather than a right." Courts which followed
this rationale found that a public employer could place any
restriction upon such employment because the employee had
no "right" to his job.
Both theories were rejected by the Supreme Court in
Shapiro.2 As policy rationale they "have lost not only their
compelling nature, but also their constitutionality.'"'" Similarly, the fear expressed at a board meeting "that if there
were empty teacherages district taxpayers might question the
need for lodging . . .,,5 would be rejected using the Shapiro
reasoning.
The school district obviously has a significant interest in
insuring that its teachers arrive at classes on time. Having
teachers available in the local community and fully participating in the school situation is equally important. However,
most courts would hold these not to be compelling interests."
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals established a useful
standard in Battle v. Mulholland5" for determining questions
of compelling state interest in the field of public employment
tenure. In that case a black policeman rented rooms in his
house to white women employed on an antipoverty project.
For this reason he was dismissed from the police force. In
reversing the lower court's decision against the policeman,
the Appeals Court held there must be a finding that the "conduct would materially and substantially impair his usefulness
as a police officer."5 7 Applied to O'Melia, the Mulholland
rule would require the school board to prove that Roush's
and O'Melia's conduct of not living in Wamsutter "materially and substantially" impaired their usefulness as teachers.
51. Kennedy v. City of Newark, 29 N.J. 178, 148 A.2d 473 (1959).
52. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 632-33; see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) ; Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439
(1968).
53. Krzewinski v. Kugler, supra note 15, at 498.
54. O'Melia, supra note 1, at 543.
55. Krzewinski v. Kugler, supra note 15, at 499 n.6; Donnelly v. City of Man-

chester, 274 A.2d 789, 791

(N.H.

1971).

Contra,

Salt Lake City Fire

Fighters Local 1645 v. Salt Lake City, 22 Utah 2d 115, 449 P.2d 239 (1969) ;
Berg v. City of Minneapolis, 274 Minn. 277, 143 N.W.2d 200 (1966). However, these courts applied the "rational" doctrine of reasonableness.
56. 439 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1971).
57. Id. at 325; see also, Comment, Teachers and the First Amendment, 7 WILLAMETTE L. J. 435, 449 (1971).
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One of the most convincing arguments nullifying the
compelling nature of the school board's policy is that it was
limited to "new teachers." If the board's purpose was actually compelling, the restriction would have included all teachers. Finally, the "failure to enforce the rule at the time
Roush commenced his employment"" and the school superintendent's "lack of sympathy with the rule"" both indicate
the policy's non-compelling nature.
CONTRACT STATUS

After dismissing the teachers' constitutional contentions
the Wyoming Supreme Court based its decision upon the plaintiffs' contractual status. Roush was a continuing contract
teacher," while O'Melia was an initial contract teacher."'
The Court reversed the District Court as to the continuing
contract teacher, Roush, and held that he had an "expectancy
of continued employment."" 2 Also, the words "new teachers"
were found to be ambiguous in reference to Roush (but apparently not to O'Melia). The Court ruled that it would be
unjust and unreasonable to hold Roush to the contract and
remanded his action.
In the recent U.S. Supreme Court case of Perry v. Sindermann5 the Court maintained that the teacher's "lack of
a contractual or tenure 'right' to re-employment . . . is immaterial to his free speech cliam." 4 In the companion case,
Justice Stewart stated that tenure or continuing contract
58. O'Melia, supra note 1, at 542.
59. Id. at 543.
"Continuing contract teacher:
60. WYO. STAT. § 21.1-152(b) (Supp. 1971).
(i) Any initial contract teacher who has been employed by the same school
district in the State of Wyoming for a period of three (3) consecutive
school years, . . . and has had his contract renewed for a fourth consecuhas achieved continuing contract
tive school year; or (ii) A teacher who ....
status in one district, and who has taught two (2) consecutive school years
a
third
consecutive school year by
renewed
for
and has had his contract
the employing school district."
61. WYO. STAT. § 21.1-152(d) (Supp. 1971). "Initial contract teacher: Any
teacher who has not achieved continuing contract status."
62. The Wyoming Supreme Court made this ruling based upon the following
language of Wyo. Stat. § 21.1-154 (Supp. 1971): "A continuing contract
teacher shall be employed by each school district on a continuing basis from
year to year without annual contract renewal ..
U.S- ------,92 S. Ct. 2694 (1972).
63-.......
64. Id. at 2698.
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rights"5 were relevant in procedural questions but not in substantive rights cases." Thus if the Wyoming Court had
recognized the validity of the teachers' constitutional claim,
their contractual status would have been irrelevant.
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR

PUBLic

EMPLOYMENT

Prior to Shapiro, residency requirements for public
employment were generally found to be constitutional. Residency restrictions upon political candidates,"1 city attorneys,68
firemen, 9 policemen," court employees 7 and municipal employees generally72 were upheld. In all of these decisions the
courts utilized the "rational" doctrine of reasonableness to
determine the validity of the restraints.73
Since the Shapiro decision many residency requirements
have been upheld, but their validity has been tested using the
compelling state interest doctrine. 4 A notable exception to
this general trend is Donnelly v. City of Manchester.75 This
1971 decision interpreted a statutory requirement that all
classified employees of the city, including school teachers,
be residents of the city. The New Hampshire Supreme Court
used the "rational" doctrine of reasonableness instead of the
65. O'Melia, supra note 1, at 542. The Wyoming Court modified Monahan v.
Board of Trustees, 486 P.2d 235, 236-37 (Wyo. 1971) by stating. "[W]e
there perhaps overstated in our effort to give a correct interpretation of
the section [Wyo. Stat § 21.1-154 (Supp. 1971)] and in so doing denominating the right given therein as being tenure...."
U.S.
, 92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972).
66. The Board of Regents v. Roth, .
67. Huey v. Etheridge, 234 Ala. 264, 175 So. 268 (1937); People v. Mertz, 2
Cal. 2d 136, 39 P.2d 422 (1934) ; State v. Williams, 99 Mo. 291, 12 S.W. 905
(1889); Jack v. Power, 282 App. Div. 831, 124 N.Y.S.2d 433, aff'd 306 N.Y.
555, 114 N.E.2d 776 (1953).
68. Warnock v. Town of Maryville, 16 Wash. 2d 710, 134 P.2d 710 (1943).
69. Salt Lake City Fire Fighters Local 1645 v. Salt Lake City, 22 Utah 2d 115,
449 P.2d 239 (1969).
70. State v. Hall, 111 N.C. 369, 16 S.E. 420 (1892).
71. Marcellus v. Kern, 170 Misc. 281, 10 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1939).
72. Archer v. Civil Service Comm., 1 Cal. 2d 357, 34 P.2d 1023 (1934); Kennedy
v. Newark, 29 N.J. 178, 148 A.2d 473 (1959); Dierssen v. Civil Service
Comm., 43 Cal. App. 2d 53, 110 P.2d 513 (1941).
73. For a complete review of similar decisions see McQUILLIN, 3 MUNICIPAL
CORP,)RATIONS § 12.59, pp. 270-75 (3rd ed. 1963).
74. Krzewinski v. Kugler, supra note 15 (upheld residency restrictions upon
policemen and firemen); Lawrence v. Cleveland, 13 Cal. App. 3d 127, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 863 (1971) (declared a five-year requirement for office of city
councilman was not justified by a compelling interest, but upheld a oneyear requirement).
75. 274 A.2d 789 (N.H. 1971).
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compelling state interest doctrine, and still held the residency restriction invalid as to teachers. The court could not
find a "reasonable" justification for the restrictions upon
the teachers' right to travel."
Until the Wyoming Supreme Court makes a clear determination as to the constitutional validity of public employment residency restrictions, such restraints must be assumed
to be enforceable. The Court's emphasis upon strict adherence
to contract provisions and its use of the waiver concept must
be important considerations in any public employment contract case in Wyoming. Under the O'Melia ruling expectancy
of continued employment and its resulting property right are
vital in establishing a constitutionally protectible interest in
a public employment situation.7 7
CONCLUSION

Shapiro established the right of travel as a "fundamental" right independent of any supporting constitutional provision. The right of travel intrastateis correlative to the right
of interstate movement and "fundamental" within the meaning of Shapiro. The standard which the U. S. Supreme Court
has established for examining restrictions upon such rights
is the compelling state interest doctrine. When determining
the validity of restrictions upon a teacher's fundamental constitutional rights, contractual status or purported contractual
waiver are irrelevant. The relevant question is whether or not
the school board has some compelling justification conferring
the power to restrict the right of travel.
Under the compelling state interest doctrine, any substantial restriction upon the "fundamental" right of travel
must meet two criteria.7" First, the existing state interest
utilized to justify the residency requirement must be "compelling," not merely "rational" or "legitimate." Second, the
residency restriction must be no greater than necessary and
76. Id. at 791.
77. O'Melia, supra note 1, at 542.
78. These criteria are articulated in Singer, Student Power at the Polls, 31
OHIO ST. L. REV. 703, 715 (1970).
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accomplished by using the constitutionally optimum solution.
In addition, the public employer has the burden of demonstrating that the compelling state interest doctrine standards
have been met.
America is a society in motion. Freedom of movement is
vital to the very existence of a dynamic industrial society.
Shapiro and its offspring simply give legal recognition to
these modern realities. The boundaries of the right of travel
have not been firmly established but the weight of authority
clearly favors invalidations of residency requirements upon
teachers.
HARRY W. REED

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1973

13

